QUONlAM IGITUR QUE SIT. — Prosa 10
"For as moche thanne as thow hast seyn whiche is the fourme
of good that nys nat parfit, and whiche is the forme of good that
is parfit, now trowe I that it were good to schewe in what this
perfeccioun of blisfulnesse is set. And in this thing I trowe
that we schulde first enquere for to witen, yf that any swich
maner good as thilke good that thow hast dyffinysshed a litel
herebyforn (that is to seyn, sovereyn good) may be founde
in the nature of thinges, for that veyn ymagynacioun of thought
ne desceyve us nat, and put us out of the sothfastnesse of thilke
thing that is summytted to us. But it may nat be denyed that
thilke good ne is, and that it nys ryght as a welle of alle
goodes. For alle thing that is cleped inparfyt is proevid
inparfit be the amenusynge of perfeccioun or of thing that is
parfit. And herof cometh it that in every thing general, yif that
men seen any thing that is inparfit, certes in thilke general
ther moot ben som thing that is parfit. For yif so be that
perfeccioun is don awey, men may nat thinke ne say fro whennes
thilke thing is that is cleped inparfyt. For the nature of
thinges ne took nat hir begynnynge of thinges amenused and
inparfit, but it procedith of thinges that ben alle hole and
absolut, and descendith so doun into uttereste thinges and into
thinges
empty and withouten fruyt. But, as I have
schewid a litel herebyforn that yif ther be a blisfulnesse that
be freel and veyn and inparfyt, ther may no man doute that ther
nys som blisfulnesse that is sad, stedefast, and parfyt."
Boece. "This is
concluded," quod I, "feermely and
soothfastly."
Philosophie. "But considere also," quod sche," in whom
this blissefulnes enhabiteth. The comune accordaunce and conceyt
of the corages of men proveth and graunteth that God, prince of
alle thinges, is good. For, so as nothyng mai hen thought betere
than God, it mai nat ben douted thanne that he that no thinge nys
betere, that he nys good. Certes resoun scheweth that God is so
good that it proeveth by verray force that parfyt good is in hym.
For yif God nys swyche, he ne mai nat be prince of alle thinges;
for certes somthing possessyng in itself parfyt good schulde be
more worthy than God, and it scholde semen that thilke thing were
first and eldere than God. For we han schewyd apertely that alle
thinges that ben parfyt ben first er thynges that ben inparfit;
and forthy, for as moche as that my resoun or my proces ne go nat
awey withouten an ende, we owe to graunte that the sovereyn God
is ryght ful of sovereyn parfit good. And we han establissched
that the sovereyne good is verray blisfulnesse. Thanne moot it
nedis be that verray blisfulnesse is set in sovereyn God."
Boece. "This take
I wel," quod I, "ne this ne mai nat
he withseid in no manere."
"But I preye the," quod sche, "see now how thou mayst proeven
holily and withoute corrupcioun this that I have seid, that the
sovereyn God is ryght ful of sovereyne good."
"In whiche manere?" quod I.
"Wenestow aught," quod sche, "that this prince of alle thynges
have itake thilke sovereyne good anywher out of hymself, of
whiche sovereyne good men proeveth that he is ful; ryght as thou
myghtest thenken that God, that hath blisfulnesse in hymself, and
thilke blisfulnesse that is in hym, were divers in substaunce?
For yif thow wene that God have resseyved thilke good out of
hymself, thow mayst wene that he that yaf thilke good to God be
more worth than is God. But I am beknowe and confesse, and that
ryght dignely, that God is ryght worthy aboven alle thinges. And
yif so be that this good be in hym by nature, but that it is
dyvers from hym by wenynge resoun, syn we speke of God prynce of
alle thynges, feyne who so feyne mai who was be that hath
conjoyned thise divers thynges togidre. And eek at the laste se
wel that a thing that is divers from any thing, that thilke thing
nys nat that same thing fro whiche it es undirstonden to be
diverse. Thanne folweth it that thilke thing that be his nature
is divers from sovereyn good, that that thyng nys nat sovereyn
good; but certes it were a felenous cursydnesse to thinken that
of hym that no thing nys more worth. For alwey, of alle thinges,
the nature of hem ne may nat hen betere thanne hir begynnynge.
For whiche I mai concluden by ryght verray resoun that thilke
that is begynnynge of alle thinges, thilke same thing is sovereyn
good in his substaunce."
Boece. "Thow hast
seyd ryghtfully," quod I.
Philosophie. "But we han graunted," quod sche, "that
the sovereyn good is blisfulnesse."
"That is sooth," quod I.
"Thanne," quod sche, "moten we nedes granten and
onfessen
that thilke same sovereyn good be God."
"Certes," quod I, "Y ne may nat denye ne withstonde the
resouns purposed; and I se wel that it folweth by strengthe of
the premisses."
"Loke now," quod sche, "yif this be proevid yet more fermely
thus, that there ne mowen not ben two sovereyn goodis that ben
divers among hemself. For certes the goodis that ben divers among
hemself, the toon is nat that that the tothir is; thanne ne mowen
neither of hem ben parfit, so as eyther of hem lakketh to othir.
But that that nys nat parfit, men mai seen apertely that it nys
not sovereyn. The thinges thanne that hen sovereynly gode ne mowe
by no weie be divers. But I have wel concluded that blisfulnesse
and God ben the sovereyn good; for whiche it mote nedes be that
sovereyne blisfulnesse is sovereyn devynite."
"No thing," quod I, "nys more sothfaste than this,
ne more ferme by resoun, ne a more worthy thing than God mai not
ben concluded."
Philosophie. "Upon thise thynges thanne," quod sche,
"ryght as thise geometriens whan thei han schewed her
proposicions ben wont to bryngen yn thinges that thei clepen
porismes or declaracions of forseide thinges, right so wol I yeve
the here as a corolarie or a meede of coroune. Forwhy, for as
moche as by the getynge of blisfulnesse men ben makid blisful,
and blisfulnesse is dyvinite, than is it manifest and opene that
by the getynge of dyvinite men ben makid blisful. Right as by the
getynge of justise [men ben maked just], and be the getynge of
sapience thei ben maked wise, ryght so nedes by the semblable
resoun, whan they han geten dyvinite thei ben maked goddes.
Thanne is every blisful man God. But certes by nature ther nys
but o God; but by the participacioun of dyvinite ther ne let ne
distourbeth nothyng that ther ne ben many goddis."
"This ys," quod I, "a fair thing and a precious, clepe it as
thou wilt, be it corolarie, or porisme, or mede of coroune, or
declarynges."
"Certes," quod sche, "nothing nys fairere than is the thing
that by resoun schulde ben addide to thise forseide thinges."
"What thing?" quod I.
"So," quod sche, "as it semeth that blisfulnesse
conteneth many thinges, it weere for to witen whether that alle thise
thinges maken or conjoynen as a maner body of blisfulnesse by
diversite of parties or membres, or elles yif ony of alle thilke
thinges be swich that it acomplise by hymself the substaunce of
blisfulnesse, so that alle thise othere thynges ben referrid and
brought to blisfulnesse (that is to seyn,
as to the cheef of
hem)."
"I wolde," quod I, "that thow madest me clerly to undirstonde
what thou seist, and that thou recordidest me the forseide
thinges."
"Have I not jugged," quod sche, "that blisfulnesse is good?"
"Yys for sothe," quod I, "and that sovereyn
good."
"Adde thanne," quod sche, "thilke good that is maked
blisfulnesse to alle the forseide thinges. For thilke same
blisfulnesse [is] demed to ben sovereyn suffisaunce, thilke
selve is sovereyn power, sovereyn reverence, sovereyn clernesse
or noblesse, and sovereyn delyt. What seistow thanne of alle
thise thinges, that is to seyn, suffisaunce, power, and thise
othere thinges, — ben thei thanne as membris of blisfulnesse, or
ben they reffered and brought to sovereyne good ryght as alle
thinges [ben] brought to the cheef of hem?"
Boece. "I
undirstonde wel," quod I, "what thou
purposest to seke, but I desire for to herkne that thow schew it
me."
Philosophie. "Tak now thus the discrecioun of this
questioun," quod sche; "yif alle thise thinges," quod sche,
"weren membris to felicite, thanne weren thei dyverse that on fro
that othir. And swich is the nature of parties or of membres,
that diverse membris compounen a body."
"Certes," quod I, "it hath wel ben schewyd herebyforn that
alle thise thinges ben al o thyng."
"Thanne ben thei none membres," quod sche, "for
elles it
schulde seme that blisfulnesse were conjoyned al of o membre
allone; but that is a thing that mai not ben don."
"This thing," quod I, "nys not doutous; but I abide to herknen
the remenaunt of the question."
"This is opene and cler," quod sche, "that alle othere thinges
ben referrid and brought to good. For therfore is suffisaunce
requerid, for it is demyd to ben good; and forthy is power
requirid, for men trowen also that it be good; and this same
thing mowen we thinken and conjecten of reverence, and of
noblesse, and of delyt. Thanne is sovereyn good the somme and the
cause of al that oughte ben desired; forwhy thilke thing that
withholdeth no good in itselve, ne semblance of good, it ne mai
not wel in no manere be desired ne requerid. And the contrarie;
for thoughe that thinges by here nature ne ben not gode, algates
yif men wene that thei ben gode, yet ben thei desired as theigh
that thei were verrayliche gode; and therefore is it that men
oughte to wene by ryghte that bounte be the sovereyn fyn and the
cause of alle the thinges that ben to requiren. But certes thilke
that is cause for whiche men
requiren any thing, it
semeth that thilke same thing be moost desired. As thus: yf that
a wyght wolde ryden for cause of hele, he ne desireth not so
mochel the moevyng to ryden, as the effect of his hele. Now
thanne, syn that alle thynges ben required for the grace of good,
thei ne ben not desired of alle folk more than the same good. But
we han grauntide that blisfulnesse is that thing for whiche that
alle thise othere thinges ben desired; thanne is it thus that
certes oonly blysfulnesse is requered and desired. By whiche
thing it scheweth cleerly that of good and of blisfulnesse is al
on and the same substaunce."
I se nat," quod I, "wherfore that men myghten
discorden in
this."
"And we han schewed that God and verray blisfulnesse is al o
thing."
"That is sooth," quod I.
"Thanne mowen we concluden sykerly, that the substaunce
of God
is set in thilke same good, and in noon other place.
